Anne Maclean has written a book which purports to identify and then definitively to reject the claims which she perceives to be the claims of bioethics. Ifshe is right, then the enterprise to which this journal is dedicated is misconceived and worthless. In this paper, I attempt to show why so farfrom being not right she is comprehensively wrong, both in her understanding of the nature of bioethics and in the specific moral claims she makes about those she terms 'bioethicists'. Since much of her book-length study is devoted to a criticism of my own work, this paper analyses the extent to which Maclean's criticisms of me, and by extension, of other bioethicists, are sustainable.
'If a man could write a book on ethics which really was a book on ethics this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books in the world.' Ludwig Wittgenstein (1) From the point of view of ethics it is perhaps disappointing to note that there are still books in the world. It must, however, be particularly galling for Anne Maclean, who has attempted to write a book on ethics based on Wittgensteinian aphorisms.
Maclean's book regards the enterprise to which this journal is dedicated as futile; for her, ethics is largely a matter of holding the right attitudes, and she equates the whole tradition of bioethics with one small part of it, namely consequentialist ethics: three good reasons to say something about the plausibility of such claims.
That this latter claim at least is absurd will be obvious to anyone who knows the field.
Consequentialist ethics can claim only a minority role and influence as bioethics is currently practised worldwide. Maclean clearly regards consequentialist bioethics as a dominant orthodoxy against which she must crusade. But, so far from being an orthodoxy, there are many countries in which consequentialist ethics are scarcely recognised and barely tolerated (2).
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Reasons and persons
PERSONS
The second chapter of Maclean's book is devoted to a discussion of personhood and the role it plays in bioethics.
Her target is my own account of personhood. Maclean has two main objections to my theory of personhood. The first is that it is false and the second that it is a theory.
My account of personhood may well be false, or at least inadequate, but not for any reasons Maclean has produced. Her main objection to it, however, is that it is a theory, and such an objection from a philosopher might be described (to borrow an analogy from pugilism) as leading with your chin.
Maclean's objections are as follows:
'Harris claims that our belief that the lives of "normal adult human beings" have value implies that value must be attached to the life of any individual which is like a normal adult in being rational and self-conscious. But even if it does, which I doubt, the conclusion is that the lives of all rational, self-conscious creatures have value; it is not that the lives of only rational, self-conscious creatures have value. Yet it is the second of these statements, and not the first, which constitutes a summary of Harris's theory' (3). 
What matters morally?
Maclean has in large part been tilting at windmills. In her opening chapter she says:
'The objection I wish to make to the bioethical enterprise is a fundamental one. It is that philosophy as such delivers no verdict on moral issues; ... When bioethicists deliver a verdict upon the moral issues raised by medical practice, it is their own verdict they deliver and not the verdict of philosophy itself (1 5);
No one, so far as I am aware, has ever claimed that 'philosophy itself delivers any verdicts about anything. Philosophy, and the branch of philosophy devoted to biomedical ethics, is far too diverse for that. However, it is simply not true that the alternative is that all individual philosophers have to offer is their own voice and verdict. Where philosophers produce arguments and evidence, as almost all do and believe they should do, then the evidence and arguments are what deliver the verdicts. Although Maclean says that all she wishes to reject is the 'conception of rational justification' used by consequentialist philosophers, ' and not the concept itself, she does in fact frequently reject rational argument and any attempt at it, in favour of the assertion and re-assertion of her own apparent prejudices, or 'attitudes' as she prefers to call them. To add insult to injury (from a philosophical point of view) she claims that this is not only doing philosophy but also somehow occupies the moral high ground. '[Ultilitarianism itself has its full share of morally repugnant implications. If the ethic which bioethicists urge upon us is supposed to be necessary for moral salvation, I for one, would prefer to be damned then saved' (16).
Maclean's claim to the moral high ground is further weakened by the way in which she implies that those with whom she disagrees hold 'vulnerable' positions which clearly they do not in fact hold. In chapter seven for example, she summarises the account I give of life's value and then says: 'I shall now advance some objections to this sort of analysis, taking, not the version given by Harris, but the fuller version given by James Rachels ...' (17 The specific aim of the conference is to suggest possible directions to strengthen the principle that the correct approach to biomedical research, which is frequently subject to the pressure of advanced technologies, must first take into account the protection of human beings.
In an attempt to draw the necessary line between the requirements of research and knowledge, and the rights and dignity of human beings, a consensus statementalthough containing some controversial points -has been approved by the Assembly of the European Council. It appears to be necessary to think over and to discuss this document before its final draft and approval.
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